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Abstract: In this Editor’s column I suggest a more modern aesthetics, in order to
fill in some of the promise the current Special Issue on The Birth of the Discipline
has in store for us. I base my suggestion more on Kant and Aristotle, though.
I. MODERN AESTHETICS
1. Several changes occurred during the so-called Enlightenment, some of which
set in decades or centuries before. A mechanisation of our worldview led to
a turn to rationality and a change in ethics which was liberated from reli-
gious authorities.1 Aristotle’s doctrine of the ‘four causes’ and his idea of the
natural place of things were dismissed – even though this doctrine and idea
neatly fit the world of perception – a physicalist notion of causation is intro-
duced.2 The ‘arts’ changed into the so-called modern system of the fine arts.3
Works of fine art were no longer supposed to be functional, but aesthetic:
intended for the appreciation by an art audience. Art practice developed into
an autonomous whole based in feedback mechanisms that regulate artists, art
works, art audiences, art institutions and art curators, art criticism and the
standards of taste, and the new philosophical discipline of aesthetics.4
2. When religious legitimation dropped out of our worldview, aesthetics
and art were considered to become the next candidates for legitimising the
social.5 I suggest that we revive, and revise that tradition. Within the
discipline of aesthetics, a conflict between objectivism and subjectivism arose,
which was dissolved by Burke and especially Kant’s turn to subjectivism.
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3. Kant argued that a judgement of taste can not be based on cognitive
or rational concepts, or rules, not on knowledge or ethical principles, nor on
partial interests, arousal or affects. Instead, it is based on the subjective
purposiveness of the beautiful object. The beautiful object presents itself
to one as fully functional for one’s cognitive powers, and one judges this by
considering everyone else’s virtual judgement of taste:
we compare our judgment not so much with the actual as rather
with the merely possible judgments of others, and [thus] put our-
selves in the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from
the limitations that [may] happen to attach to our own judging.6
So understood, an aesthetic judgement is an awareness whose phenomenology,
allegedly, can be shared with others. The judgement of taste is subjective
but not idiosyncratically so. It discloses our sociability, and forms its basis,
it grounds our Gesellichkeit.
I maintain that taste can be called a sensus communis more le-
gitimately than can sound understanding, and that the aesthetic
power of judgment deserves to be called a shared sense more than
does the intellectual one, if indeed we wish to use the word sense
to stand for an effect that mere reflection has on the mind, even
though we then mean by sense the feeling of pleasure. We could
even define taste as the ability to judge something that makes our
feeling in a given presentation universally communicable without
mediation by a concept.7
4. Sticking with this argument in the Critique of Judgement, I think that
the ethical – the moral duty within – must be understood as based in the
aesthetic. But I do not view the aesthetic as about beauty and like aesthetic
values, which are aesthetic in a rather narrow sense, such as when we say that
we dislike a film because it is ‘merely aesthetic’. The aesthetic is so fundamen-
tal to our lives because it concerns itself with what connects people without
requiring them to resort to theories or principles. Core issues in aesthetics
taken broadly like this are human interaction, gazing at each other, seeing
the other, i.e. recognising them as the person they want themselves to be
seen as. The aesthetic concerns the psychologies of the ones involved in thick
moral situations, their mutual power balance, or unbalance (the rhetorical),
and how it feels to be in a particular moral situation (the phenomenological).
5. We are already in the habit of talking in such terms about works of
art: how an artist made a work such that it: appeals to the spectator; ad-
dresses them; induces them to attentively scrutinise its surface, enjoy it, and
understand it as intended by the artist to make them think about something
– opening an autonomous area of thought and feeling. We are not just in-
terested in the message, but in the way it is brought to us (the rhetorical
aspect). Just like what happens when we are with someone. We connect our
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own psychological reality with that of the individual style and the expres-
sion in the work, again, just like we would assess another person.8 And the
central question is What is it like to experience this work before one (the
phenomenology)?
II. TEA BAG QUESTIONS
6. The labels of the tea bags we use at home ask us all sorts of ‘profound’
questions, such as What would you advise your younger self? Indeed, what
would that be? It is obvious, to myself at least, that my life has not been
flawless and that at many crossroads I might better have taken a different
turn. One can only agree with Aristotle’s assessment of the tragedy. He did
not only analyse the tragedy in his Poetics, the analysis concerned the psy-
chology of human life in general.9 Tragedy provides ‘universal truths[, where]
history treats of particular facts’. ‘By universal truths are to be understood
the kinds of thing a certain type of person will probably or necessarily say or
do in a given situation.’10
We make many a decision of which we do not know all the possible conse-
quences, and they all accumulate to the one action that characterises our life.
Everything we do adds to that one action, and we know which action that
is only when all is said and done.11 So back to the tea bag label’s question
What would I advise my younger self?
7. No matter how hard I try I cannot find any one advice. I thought
of this girl I had a crush on when I was 17. We had been in the pub with
our friends, and I had all but ignored her for fear of rejection. After we left
together, I told her about my feelings for her. She seemed touched, but did
not hesitate to tell me that she could not start anything with me because I
reminded her of a good friend who had died in a crash with his moped. I
could not have told my 17 year old self to stop with these crushes, because
they flocked my mind. Should I tell myself to ignore this girl and choose
someone else? But surely I had a crush on her, and this crush was all mine,
I could not simply switch to another girl – on the ground of which objective
argument? And suppose I had obeyed any such advice of my future self, then
I would have missed the existential sorrow that engulfed me, a grief about not
being recognised, mixed with anger. I had lived in the direction of this type
of situations for a multitude of reasons. These affections all defined me. Had
someone – my future me – have prevented this particular failure, it would –
it should – occur on another day, in another guise. Whatever issues I had
with myself and my surroundings were mine to suffer and learn from.12
8. Everything that happened between me and my friends in those days
was grounded in the aesthetics of my social life – and this fact characterises
each and everyone of us. How do we see each other? Was I seen the way I
would have wanted to be seen? Did I deserve to be seen the way I wanted to
be seen – or rather, in the way people saw me? I guess I deserved all of that,
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for being the kind of person I had become by then.
We all have a right to be seen as the person whom we feel we are – though
perhaps we do not always know our feelings too well. We are how we respond
to other people’s responses to us. I would say that the right to be recognised
as the person whom we feel we are is always under negotiation, with the other
as well as ourselves. So we look at each other and do our best to connect
with the other, and in the process we constantly reassess what we think the
other is seeing, and what we think we are seeing in the other. Looking at
each other is not a state, but a process based in the psychologies of those
involved, and the negotiation is its rhetorical aspect. The criterion of success
is just how it feels for both of you.
9. To be clear, looking at each other forms the core of social life, so the
core of social life is based in psychological, rhetorical and phenomenological
aspects of perception, in short, in its aesthetics. Perhaps we can say that we
practise these processes – in all their aspects – with art. As said, I do not
view aesthetics as the philosophical discipline concerned with only the more
narrow aesthetic values like beauty, ugliness or the sublime or its respective
norms of success.
10. I propose, then, to develop an ethics that starts from the tragic nature
of how each one of us lives our life.13 We are all underway to become who we
are to be, given that every choice that we make is embedded in our psychology
and its subjective history. Some narrative works of art show us literally
how this works, these works fit Aristotle’s defence of poetry over anecdotal
history.14 But all art tends to be viewed in terms of their psychological,
rhetorical and phenomenological aspects, such aspects as are also at work
in moral behaviour. Therefore, next to debating the logic of our ethical
principles, we should always also look at the particular predicament someone
is in when they are confronted with the need to make a choice. At the core
of morality lie our aesthetic judgements.
In this special issue on The Birth of the Discipline we see ample opportunity
to understand the attention for the criteria of taste as narrowed. Looking
back once again, may help us look forward. I thank Endre Szécsényi for




2I am not defending Aristotle against
mechanistic science though, to be clear.
See Aristotle 1984, II 3, 194b-195a3, 23-
24.
3Paul Oskar Kristeller 1978a and
1978b.
4I don’t mean Hume’s standard of
taste, but standards developed in art prac-
tice which pertain to the art forms and
the masterworks conforming to the phe-
nomenological specifications of these art
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forms. Van Gerwen 2014.
5Charles Taylor 1985. Odo Marquard
1962, 238 argued ‘daß die Ästhetik seit
Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts und dem
Anspruch nach bis Heute zur diensthaben-
den Fundamentalphilosophie wird.’
6Kant 1987, p. 160, §40:2.
7Kant 1987, p. 162, §40:4.
8Wollheim 1993.
9Rorty 1992.
10Aristotle 1986, Chapter 9. ‘Poetic
Truth and Historical Truth’, 43-44.
11‘Tragedy, then, is a representation of
an action that is . . . complete in itself . . . ’
Aristotle 1986, Chapter 6. ‘A Description
of Tragedy’, 38-39.
12The tea bag question was, in the end,
rather shallow.
13Wollheim 1984.
14Nowadays one should think of film,
which adds the phenomenology of the gaze
and of the affordances of things and events
to stage-performed tragedy.
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